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Abstract 
Mozambique and Angola both had nominally Marxist governments after independence in 1975.  This 
paper discusses the extent to which this may have had an effect on development policies in subsequent 
years.  The conclusion is that while there may have been some influence, the colonial history and material 
conditions of the countries had a far greater impact than did the ideological affiliations of ruling parties. 
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Angola and Mozambique - What IS Marxism in the African Context? 
 
Many of the most important differences and similarities between Angola and 
Mozambique predate the arrival of the Portuguese in the 15th century.  When we put the 
question of Marxist economic orientation in this context the two decades of so-called Marxist 
development seems rather a small issue when compared to half a millennium of colonial history.   
The pre-existing conditions in each country had much more influence on their development 
prospects than do their years of Marxist economic policy.  In fact, in many ways it is difficult to 
pinpoint actual “Marxist” policies distinct from those followed by other similar countries at the 
same level of development.   
In terms of broad similarities, both countries contain within their borders a variety of 
African ethnic groups many of which had no sense of common identity prior to the arrival of the 
Europeans.  Both countries also contained substantial kingdoms, with well defined borders and 
centralized political control, most notably the Kongo kingdom on the west coast of Africa, which 
had its capital in what is now Angola (though it extended northward into what is now Zaire and 
the Congo), and the kingdoms of Sofala and Muenemutapa in Mozambique. 
The goals of the Portuguese were not primarily ones of conquest and settlement.  Rather, 
the prinicipal aim of the early explorers was to open routes for extraction of commodities, among 
which were spices, gold, ivory and slaves.  This had important implications for the local 
populations as it meant that there was no overriding need for the Portuguese to control territory 
or to rule directly.  Rather, it was more convenient for them to reach accommodations with local 
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political leaders in order to develop trading relationships which would allow them to extract the 
desired export commodities.  While land grants, called prazos, were made by the Portuguese 
crown, these grants were more akin to zones of extraction than they were to colonial land grants 
made by other European powers.  For the most part, there was no concerted effort to promote 
economic development nor to settle Portuguese on these lands, and this remained the case until 
the 20th century.1 
Angola and Mozambique differed markedly in terms of international economic relations 
prior to the European arrival.  While trade with interior areas to the east did exist in the Kongo 
kingdom, there was no well developed network of commerce via seaborne trade.  In contrast, the 
Mozambican coast was part of an extremely well developed Indian Ocean maritime trading 
economy dominated by Arab trading centers such as Zanzibar and Kilwa.  Accordingly, the role 
of the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean was more to displace the current dominant trading powers 
than to open up new trade relations as was the case on the west coast of the continent.  Here, the 
dominant export was slaves; it is reported that approximately 3 million slaves were sent from 
what is now Angola mainly to Brazil over the period from the first Portuguese contact in the late 
fifteenth century to the 1830’s when the trade was effectively abolished.2  
Until the partition of Africa by European powers in the late 1800’s there was little effort 
by the Portuguese to settle or directly control the interior of either country.  However, at that 
time it became clear that the main criterion for colonial borders was to follow the dictum 
“possession is 9/10 of the law” – or 100% in this case.  Accordingly, the Portuguese began to 
push into the interior of both Mozambique and Angola, an effort that picked up speed in the 
1930’s when Portugal sought among other things to alleviate its own unemployment problems by 
exporting large numbers of settlers and peasant farmers abroad. 
This massive influx of Europeans resulted in a situation in which virtually every formal 
sector job in the economies of both countries were dominated by whites.  Every salaried job, 
1 See Issacman 1983;  Isaacman and Isaacman 1996; Pitcher 1994 and Newitt 1995 for a discussion of the colonial 
era.  
2 See Austen 1987 for a summary of the slave trade in Portuguese Africa.  See also ZA and JM Konczacki  eds.  An 
Economic History of Tropical Africa Frank Cass 1977 
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including taxi drivers, waiters, ticket takers, etc. was held by Portuguese, leaving no role 
whatsoever for Africans in the formal sector.  Agriculture too, became heavily Europeanized, 
with a large smallholder African peasant sector coexisting with a commercialized sector of 
medium sized European farms and large plantations.  Equally important was a virtual monopoly 
by the Portuguese on the network of rural traders who linked all agricultural producers to the 
market.  These bush traders and shopkeepers provided an outlet for peasant production and in 
return served as providers of agricultural inputs, consumer goods and informal credit. 
 This essay argues that “Marxism” as practiced in the Lusophone African context is 
virtually indistinguishable from authoritarian extractive regimes of any political stripe and that 
the extractive regimes of post-independence Angola and Mozambique are in many ways simply 
extensions of the old colonial regime under new management.  Though the newly independent 
governments in Angola and Mozambique were openly and avowedly Marxist, this was more of a 
label of convenience than a real indicator of ideological conviction.  The true conviction in each 
case was a determination to replace colonial hegemony and control with that of the ruling party, 
a goal which is shared by many political persuasions in Africa and around the world. 
 What does it mean to be a Marxist state in the immediate post-colonial era of the 1970’s 
in the former Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique?  If Marxism means state 
ownership of the means of production then we are in something of a definitional quandary 
because there simply wasn’t very much in the way of “means of production” in either of these 
countries at independence in 1975.  Nevertheless, to be avowedly Marxist certainly meant 
something to the governments in question so it is worth looking at exactly what it meant and how 
it evolved as time went on.  By 2013 it is safe to say that Mozambique has taken a decided turn 
toward a market economy not just in rhetoric but in fact.  Angola has taken a similar turn in 
rhetoric and to some extent in reality but clearly lags behind Mozambique in its market reforms.3 
3 These changes in direction were due in part to prodding by donors such as the World Bank and the IMF who 
strongly promoted the “Wasghington Consensus” as laid out in Williamson 1989.  But in many cases the turn to the 
market was simply an official recognition of ongoing commercial activity – i.e. simply allowing “shadow economy” 
to be sanctioned by the government. 
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 The story of how these countries became “Marxist” in the first place was strongly 
influenced by the fact that their colonial occupiers were Portuguese and were therefore members 
of NATO.  When the entirely predictable and indeed necessary independence movements began 
to coalesce in the 1960’s there was no way they were going to get any assistance or 
encouragement from other NATO allies – their only viable sources of support were the 
communist bloc countries, particularly the USSR, East Germany and to some extent Cuba.  
Getting assistance and advice from these sources carried with it the mindset and developmental 
prejudices that came with it -  a bias toward state control of the economy and a deep conviction 
that the political primacy of the party was more important than anything else.  Accordingly, 
FRELIMO in Mozambique and the MPLA in Angola took power over all aspects of the polity 
and economy from top to bottom.4 
 To a very great extent this was forced on them.  It is estimated that 95% of Portuguese 
settlers evacuated from both countries in the year during which Portugal relinquished power. 5 
Some of them were reluctant to lose their Portuguese citizenship while many were scared off by 
the Marxist rhetoric of the incoming government and were unwilling to stay if all of their assets 
(farms, factories, etc.) were to be nationalized.  Given the extreme socio-economic segregation 
along racial lines enforced by the colonial rulers, this meant that managers and owners of 
virtually every economic entity from large plantation down to rural convenience store departed 
and in many cases destroyed their assets rather than leave them to whoever was to come next.  
While both FRELIMO and the MPLA tried to continue established companies and plantations as 
going concerns, they quickly ran into a bottleneck.  The racial laws preventing education or 
assimilation of most Africans meant that there was an extreme dearth of experienced managers 
after independence.  Indeed, one observer in Mozambique stated that there were only 33 college 
graduates in the entire country after 1975.6 
 A colonial legacy that is equally important is the fact that the fascist Salazar regime 
exercised state control over the economy that was scarcely less comprehensive than what existed 
4 See Messiant 1998 for a discussion of this in Angola and various FRELIMO documents from party congresses in 
the case of Mozambique 
5 Kyle 1990 and 2005 contain a discussion of the effects of the independence related evacuation on the economy 
6 Personal communication, Minister of Finance 1988 
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in many communist countries.  Though large corporations did indeed control the “commanding 
heights” of the economy, the extent to which these were intertwined with government regulation 
and personnel should not be underestimated.  Colonies were run with an eye toward extraction of 
surplus value and to the extent that corporations could assist in this they were encouraged and 
licensed by the government.  Ownership of land and other productive assets was reserved for 
white settlers with the indigenous population relegated to less favorable zones where they were 
readily able to be called on for forced labor.  Immigration was tightly controlled and the labor 
market explicitly segmented between occupations that were considered to be “white” (all formal 
sector jobs) or “black” (menial jobs).  In this way the colonial occupiers had access to a very 
cheap labor force for agricultural labor or to rent out to neighbors to work in mines, as was the 
case in Mozambique where the government was paid in gold for Mozambican workers in South 
African mines. 
 Accordingly, it was no great leap to go from authoritarian “fascist” control of the 
economy and society to authoritarian “Marxist” control.  Neither regime countenanced political 
rivals.  Both employed police tactics to suppress opposition.  Neither countenanced what we 
would call free market economies.  Both vested ownership of major productive assets in the 
ruling class (or state if we choose the Marxist nomenclature of the newly independent 
governments).  All that was required in the first instance was a political “decapitation” of the old 
colonial regime and its replacement with new leaders.  But it would quite difficult to distinguish 
major differences between an exploitative centralizing regime run by Portuguese colonialists 
from an exploitative centralizing regime run by a small ruling clique.7 
 The degree of control and the institutional apparatus to enforce it were in some cases a 
holdover from the colonial era but also showed the influence of Eastern bloc advisors as in the 
formation of the “Economic Police” whose job was (putatively) to enforce pricing and 
distribution of goods but whose actual function was to serve as merely one more point at which 
surplus value could be extracted from productive activities via bribes or other forms of 
corruption. 
7 See e.g. Government of Angola 1997, 2000 and 2006 
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 The Continuation of State Control 
 
 The economic vacuum created by the departure of the Portuguese settlers and the ensuing 
chaos left the newly minted states little option but to take over major production units such as 
plantations and factories.  Managing such enterprises proved more difficult given the near total 
collapse of economic value chains, the inexperience of new managers, and the disappearance of 
the old forced labor arrangements that supported the profit margins of many of these concerns.  
Externally funded insurrections – RENAMO in Mozambique, funded by the white Rhodesian 
secret police and later by South Africa and the USA; and UNITA in Angola, funded by South 
Africa and the USA as well as their own diamond mines – reduced the actual governable space 
to a mere fraction of the national territory in both cases with a consequent crash in economic 
activity.8 
 It could certainly be argued that the crash was a direct result not just of the civil conflict 
though that would have been quite sufficient for the result, but also from the misguided attempt 
to exercise total economic control down to the micro level.  Evidence for this could be seen in 
the virtual emptying of government controlled marketing and distribution channels in favor of 
large informal markets which carried on outside of the regulatory regime.  However, it was 
obvious in Mozambique by the early 1980’s that not only was the government attempt at control 
failing to produce positive results, but external aid from the World Bank, the IMF and other 
agencies was conditional on a turn toward a market economy.  In Angola the economic results of 
state control were no less obvious but impinged on the lives of the ruling elite far less due to 
their access to huge flows of oil revenue derived from newly exploited offshore oil fields. 
 Indeed, these oil fields contributed to Angolan elite cynicism about the motives of 
“development assistance” since the lip service given to market reforms and good governance was 
coupled with a willingness to countenance the most bloody and horrific civil war on the 
8 See Kyle 1990 and Andersson 1992 
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continent so long as oil continued to flow.  Not only that,  but the ruling elite had little or no 
direct economic need to reform since their own needs and lifestyle could be amply supported by 
oil revenues.  This promoted a mindset which unlike almost all other countries in the region did  
not see the need to cater to donor wishes.  These attitudes were strengthened in Angola when the 
government won a virtually complete military victory over UNITA rather than negotiating a 
shared solution as recommended by donors.  In short, their system worked quite well for them 
and they didn’t feel a need to change. 
Portuguese Law and Government Structure 
 
 As noted above, the newly independent governments of Mozambique and Angola, led 
politically by FRELIMO and the MPLA, were to a great extent simply handed the existing 
situation when the Portuguese military coup of 1974 resulted in the withdrawal of Portugal and 
independence for the African countries in 1975.  One major result of this was that the political 
parties won independence not through a long war through which they could gain legitimacy and 
unite the various factions opposing the Portuguese, but rather through the fact of being the 
dominant parties in the capital cities at the time of independence. 
 What they inherited was a legal and economic structure that was very Portuguese in 
nature.  Portugal had occupied the coastal areas of Mozambique and Angola for about 500 years 
prior to independence and in the 20th century actually made them provinces of Portugal itself.  
Accordingly, the legal structure they inherited was that of Portugal and the structure of 
ownership of assets was similarly Portuguese (minus of course the settlers themselves).  As it 
turned out, the highly concentrated structure of ownership and governance was typical of all 
Iberian colonies as well as Iberia itself9. 
 In terms of the government itself, both Angola and Mozambique inherited and confirmed 
a highly centralized governing structure, with provincial and local officials appointed by and 
funded by the central apparatus.  Though “traditional” authorities continued to exercise some 
9 We refer here  to “Iberia” rather than Portugal only because these patterns extend to almost all of Latin America 
as well as Lusophone Africa 
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local power in both countries, this was strictly limited to the most local of issues confined solely 
to indigenous communities.  Any of these traditional authorities could be overruled or replaced at 
the whim of the central government.  Such centralized structures lent themselves well not only to 
“Marxist” notions of governance but also to a broad spectrum of dictatorial regimes based on 
cults of personality or party or military control.   
 It is notable that Mozambique has now progressed to the point where it has one of the 
few living, voluntarily retired, ex-Presidents on the continent and though FRELIMO has yet to 
lose an election to the opposition, recent elections have been close enough that it is inevitable 
that we will see it happen at some point in the future.  While an actual handover of power has to 
be seen to be believed, it is clearly within the realm of feasibility for it to occur. 
 Angola, on the other hand, remains under the same President elevated early in its 
independence and the ruling elite remains much the same as well.  Confronted with a much less 
politically adept opponent in UNITA the government has gone to great lengths to coopt leaders 
from UNITA, giving them a voice in government (though not a decisive one) as well as being 
able to provide substantial monetary incentives given the immense oil wealth flooding the 
country.  Indeed, the recent discoveries of huge natural gas reserves in Mozambique as well as 
other minerals will provide a major incentive to  hold on to power there as  has happened in 
Angola, making the next few years key in the political development of the country. 
 
Portuguese Land Law and its Reform 
 
 Perhaps the most contentious issue debated in either country over the post-independence 
era is that of the ownership of land and the laws and regulations through which it is formalized.10  
Both Angola and Mozambique have multiple sets of overlapping claims to land which can be 
mostly categorized as follows: 
10 See Bruce, John & Shem E. Migot-Adholla Eds.  1994. 
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- Indigenous claims based on traditional occupancy, usually not formalized but widely 
recognized in the locality where they are located.11 
- Colonial era ownership claims, mostly vacated for those settlers who left in 1975 but which 
survive in cases where settlers remained 
-  Post-independence grants of land, which can be the result of claims or grants made at various 
levels of government up to and including the Presidency itself12 
 Of course, “Marxist” doctrine states that all land belongs to the “people” and is managed 
on their behalf by the state.  This idea fits well with two important needs of any extractive 
regime, whether it be European or indigenous:  The first is the need to be able to dispose of land 
as desired in order to reward supporters in a political sense.  The second is the need to be able to 
monopolize extractive rents for mineral or other natural resource based wealth.  This was 
particularly relevant early on  in Angola where oil revenues formed (and still form) the majority 
of the income of the government.  Diamond mines were of secondary importance but are still 
large in absolute terms in Angola.  In Mozambique such extractive goals were manifest in land 
grants to large farmers but also to foreign extractive companies interested in such things as 
logging or other extractive activities.  It should be noted that many of these land grants simply 
ignored the fact that there were people already living on the lands involved. 
 Reform of the inherited Portuguese land law has proceeded in both Angola and 
Mozambique and has been the subject of extremely contentious debate both within the country 
and between the government and various donors.  Mozambicans and Angolans have taken it as a 
matter of fixed policy that land belongs to the nation as a whole and cannot be owned by 
individuals in perpetuity as is the case in most Western industrial countries.  Many donors, in 
contrast, have argued for a land law that would support an active market in land. 
 While in theory the new land laws (allowing for varying periods of tenure for the purpose 
of using the land for farming, mining, habitation, etc.) are quite specific in how tenancy is 
11 See Goody, 1969 and Gluckman 1969 for a discussion of these types of tenure 
12 See Kloeck-Jenson 1997 and 1998; MA/MSU Research Team 1994; McGregor 1995; Myers 1993 and Jayne et. al. 
2001 
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granted and held, in fact the resources to actually conduct  a cadastral survey with the associated 
bureaucratic costs has been lacking in either country.  Added to this is the problem that in some 
areas traditional farmers use shifting cultivation methods and so are not always farming the same 
plot.  The result is a hodgepodge in which competing interests in any particular area vie for 
actual control over land.  Peasants are routinely dispossessed in the interest of extractive interests 
promoted by the central or provincial governments, while large farmers also try to gain direct 
control over favored parcels. 
 None of this really resembles an actual “Marxist” system of land tenure either in theory 
or in terms of its application in existing Marxist countries anywhere in the world.  Rather, we are 
witnessing an ongoing “land grab” in which moneyed or connected players have an advantage 
over the less well off. 
 
Mineral Wealth and Marx – Is there any detectable difference?13 
 
 The short answer to the question posed above is “no”.  Both the Angolan and now the 
Mozambican governments have asserted unambiguously that the right to subsurface mineral 
wealth belongs to the government.  In fact, the Angolan government has demonstrated quite 
clearly that they are willing to wage war in whatever manner and for however long it is 
necessary for them to exert control over the entirety of the national area and its offshore 
economic zones. This includes not only oil production areas but also diamond mines in the 
northeast part of the country.  Long a source of UNITA financing, these were a major target of 
government military efforts in the long struggle to win the civil war. 
 Extraction of the oil has been done almost exclusively by foreign contractors, including 
US, European and other firms experienced in oil exploration and extraction.  This might seem 
rather “un-Marxist” but was in reality part of a situation so confused that at one point Cuban 
13 See Kyle 2005, 2006a and 2006b for a discussion of the effects of mineral revenue on the economy of Angola 
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soldiers were protecting US oil companies from South African mercenaries funded by the US 
and its allies.   
 But the question remains – Is this Marxist?  In support of our negative answer above we 
have to recognize that using foreign contractors for extraction is no more a hallmark of a 
particular ideology than is assertion of control over subsurface mineral rights – In short, 
everyone does it.   The centralizing tendencies that go along with the economics of the Resource  
Curse may appear at first glance to have some resemblance to Marxist governing philosophy but 
in reality are simply a manifestation of the fact that power follows money – and in a resource 
revenue rich country that money is located in the capital city. 
 
Marketing, Distribution, Agricultural Extension and Marx 
 
 It is in the area of marketing and distribution that Marxist thought has had the most 
pervasive, and arguably the most damaging effects on the economies of Angola and 
Mozambique.  The Marxist glorification of the production worker and the vilification of 
commercial traders and marketers as “parasites” who produce nothing of value has had a clear 
deleterious effect on the rural economy of both Angola and Mozambique.14 
 First, it is important to bear in mind that as discussed above the pre-independence 
marketing system almost completely disappeared with the departure of the Portuguese settlers 
who had virtually monopolized these activities.15  This was particularly important in rural areas 
where small stores provided a broad spectrum of services including informal rural credit.  Lack 
of capital together with the widespread destruction and chaos of civil war prevented reactivation 
of these rural markets and many remain unserved by marketers to this day. 
14 See FRELIMO 1968 and various Frelimo Party documents from 1977 and 1978 for a statement of government 
policies in these areas. 
15 See Azzam & Faucher 1988; Hilmarrsson 1995; Strachan 1997; Arndt et.al. 2000; Ministerio da Industria 2001; 
Bumb 2002; Kyle 2006 
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 The problem is that wholesalers and traders were regarded as profiting from the “honest” 
work of peasants by selling their produce for a far higher price than they paid.  The real services 
they provided – liquidity to peasants, willingness to bear market risk if prices changed, storage 
and most important, transportation services – were ignored or discounted in this view of the 
world.  All that mattered was that these traders were earning what appeared to be a healthy 
profit, though even huge margins could be illusory in a highly inflationary economy.16 
 Some districts in Angola for example, went a five years or more without once seeing a 
trader willing to purchase output from farmers.  Any attempt to service these markets had first to 
overcome physical constraints of poor roads, land mines, destroyed bridges, etc.  Even if these 
were surmounted, government regulations limited the profits that could legally be earned to a 
mere 25%, far below inflation rates during much of the 30 years following independence. 
 Indeed, this antipathy to traders extended to urban areas as well, leading to a situation 
where officially sanctioned retail outlets in the old city centers were virtually deserted, with no 
stock on their shelves, while bustling open air markets thrived on the outskirts of town.  The well 
known “Roque Santeiro” market outside Luanda was one of the largest and most diverse markets 
on the continent and though it has now been shut down with the reactivation of retail activity in 
more permanent facilities it was for many years the go-to place for a wide variety of products 
from food to consumer durables and even weapons. 
 This repression of the marketing system helped lead to a disconnection between the 
producers in the countryside and the urban demand centers on the coast.  Here, however, there 
were two big differences between Angola and Mozambique.  In Angola, the pre-existing market 
links between city and hinterland were ruptured by the independence-associated evacuation of 
Portuguese and further stifled by war and banditry.  Official repression prevented any real 
economic incentive from arising and this was exacerbated by exchange rate overvaluation which 
made competing food imports cheap on the coast.  Indeed, this situation persists to the present 
day, with command economy adherents in the government reactivating entities such as 
MECANAGRO, a state run agricultural machinery service provider which is very clearly similar 
16 Pitcher 2002 has an excellent discussion of the transition from government control to the private sector in 
various parts of the economy. 
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to machinery brigades in the old USSR but which in the Angolan context serves mainly large and 
well connected plantations rather than small farmers. 
 In Mozambique there is domestic capacity to meet urban demand on the coast, principally 
in Maputo.  However, it is important to note that these market links, unlike the Angolan case, 
were NOT pre-existing.  Rather, the southern part of the country imported food from abroad and 
paid for it with revenue from exporting labor to South African mines.  Building market links for 
grain between the North and the South is therefore a question of development rather than 
rehabilitation. 
 Finally, we must address whether repression of marketing is truly a “marker” for Marxist 
economic management.  Clearly, it is a characteristic common to many (indeed virtually all) 
Marxist economies.  However, it is not exclusive to these countries – distrust of middlemen runs 
deep in rural areas and is a routine feature of the rural worldview in many different countries – 
not just those with an avowedly Marxist government.  Indeed, the antipathy to profiteering 
middlemen owes as much to the fact that they were Portuguese colonists in the pre-independence 
era as it does to any governing economic philosophy. 
 Agricultural extension services played an important role in promoting the state view of 
marketing and were also a mechanism for controlling information and political participation in 
rural areas.  Clearly inspired by political goals, rural extension meetings were in some cases run 
by political appointees with little agricultural knowledge.  Suspicion of the motives and/or 
expertise of such personnel grew to be a problem in some areas, though general underfunding of 
extension limited the role it could actually play in many areas.17 
 
Conclusion 
 What are we to make of all of this?  It appears that even in areas where “Marxist” 
economic philosophy appears to have good explanatory power, there are also equally good 
17 See Gemo and Rivera 2001 and Eicher 2002 for an in-depth discussion of the history and role of agricultural 
extension 
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alternatives to explain what happened in Angolan and Mozambican economic policy.  To declare 
one’s party to be “Marxist” may well have been more of an artifact of shifting alliances and 
supporters than it was of any real ideological convictions.  Another indicator that this might well 
be the case is the fact that both the MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO in Mozambique have by 
now stated that they no longer consider themselves bound by the tenets of Marxist thought and 
are pursuing market based approaches to economic development.18  This is no doubt at least 
partly due to the fact that major potential donors wanted them to make such a change – But this 
is yet another indicator that professions of adherence to a particular economic orthodoxy are 
more situational than ideological in origin. 
 
 
 
  
18 See, e.g. World Bank 1996 or Republic of Mozambique 1997 and 1998 for a clear statement of this.  In Angola 
the development was somewhat later – See for example MINPLAN 2006 
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